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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to focus on the Umwelt-Welt dichotomy by means of which 
Heidegger and Gehlen attempt to describe the grounds for the ontological difference 
between human and animal. Despite their profound differences, both Heidegger and 
Gehlen, due to their common belief in the ontological specificity of the human compared 
to the animal, assume as their own the classical metaphysical point of view according to 
which an appropriate definition of man’s essence can only be attained by excluding every 
element of animality from humanity. On the basis of these premises, I criticize this theoret-
ical assumption as shared by Heidegger’s The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, 
Finitude, Solitude (1929-1930) and Gehlen’s Man. His Nature and Place in the World (1940). 
Keywords: animal philosophy; anthropocentrism; ontology; anthropological philosophy; 
animality
Resum. Mancat de què? Sobre la dicotomia Welt-Umwelt en Heidegger i Gehlen
L’objectiu d’aquest article és revisar la dicotomia Welt-Umwelt mitjançant la qual Hei-
degger i Gehlen pretenen fonamentar la diferència ontològica entre animal i humà. A 
causa de la creença compartida per ambdós autors en l’especificitat ontològica de l’humà 
davant la de l’animal, tant Heidegger com Gehlen, malgrat les profundes divergències que 
marquen els seus respectius punts de vista, acaben assumint com a propi el clàssic punt de 
vista metafísic segons el qual només en la mesura en què s’exclou en l’home tot element 
d’animalitat es pot finalment assolir una definició apropiada de la seva essència. Sobre la 
base d’aquestes premisses, es durà a terme una crítica d’aquest plantejament teòric tal com 
es manifesta en Els conceptes fonamentals de la metafísica: món, finitud, solitud de Heidegger 
(1929-1930) i en L’home. La seva natura i la seva posició en el món de Gehlen (1940).
Paraules clau: filosofia de l’animalitat; antropocentrisme; ontologia; antropologia filosòfica; 
animalitat
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0. The Umwelt in von Uexküll
My aim is to critically revise the philosophical use of the concept of Umwelt 
(environment) – developed by the biologist Jakob von Uexküll at the begin-
ning of the 20th century (Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere, 1909) – within the 
two frameworks of existentialism (Heidegger) and philosophical anthropolo-
gy (Gehlen). In particular, I reflect on the anthropocentric perspective that 
conditions the philosophical appropriation of this biological concept by both 
thinkers. Nevertheless, before reflecting on Heidegger’s and Gehlen’s interpre-
tation of the concept of Umwelt, we need to briefly revisit von Uexküll’s 
definition of the animal Umwelt in order to provide background regarding 
these theoretical appropriations.1
According to von Uexküll, the animal is a vital subject whose core activ-
ities are perceptual and operational. Hence, animal Umwelt is everything 
that the animal can perceive and can do. Umwelt is the synthesis between 
what the animal perceives in its environment – what von Uexküll calls its 
Merkwelt (perceptual world) – and what the animal can do about what it 
perceives, what von Uexküll calls Wirkwelt (operational world). What ranks 
as “object” in the human world, von Uexküll calls Merkmalträger (marks of 
significance) in the animal Umwelt, to indicate the vital role signalled by the 
animal’s particular perceptions. Therefore, the operational world is the world 
in which the animal acts in response to marks of significance from its percep-
tual world. What this means is that the animal subject, in its specific envi-
ronment, can differentiate between marks of significance, each of which poten-
tially prompts an action. Consequently, if the animal is constituted to perceive 
very few marks, then it will only be able to perform very few vital operations; 
likewise, the more marks the animal is able to perceive, the more operations it 
will be able to perform in its environment. 
In that line, as pointed out by von Uexküll in Streifzüge durch die Umwel-
ten von Tieren und Menschen (1934), Umwelt represents the outer limit of 
animal life because only within this limit does the animal have access to what-
ever is biologically significant for it. As von Uexküll expressed it, the animal 
lives as if in a “soap bubble” that varies in size according to the perceptual- 
operational capacity of its species (von Uexküll, 1957: 24). The main task of 
biological theory lies therefore in the understanding of the close connection 
between the inner world of the animal organism, characterized by the perma-
nent presence of endogenous excitations, and the external world, which is an 
inexhaustible source of vital signs allowing the organism to constantly interact 
through its specific system of receptor organs (Merkorgan) and effector organs 
(Wirkorgan).
The nuclear issue of this peculiar biological point of view consists in clear-
ly differentiating a body conceived in terms of physical and chemical param-
1. For the conceptual history of “environment”, see “The Living and Its Milieu” in Canguil-
hem (2008: 98-120); especially about von Uexküll in Canguilhem (2008: 110-113).
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eters, as the contemporary mechanist biology tries to do, from a living organ-
ism conceived like a subject acting specifically in its vital relationship with the 
environment. That is to say, the reciprocity that links the two polarities and 
gives them meaning defines the specific organism-environment relationship. 
For that reason, when von Uexküll uses the concept of Umwelt he is referring 
to this connection of perceptual world (Merkwelt) and effector world 
(Wirkwelt) resulting from the vital contact between the organism and its envi-
ronment: “For all that a subject perceives becomes his perceptual world and 
all that he does, his effector world. Perceptual and effector worlds together 
form a close unit, the Umwelt” (von Uexküll, 1957: 6). The animal is therefore 
a subject capable of filtering the stimuli coming from the external world, 
orienting its vital responses in the form of actions on this same world. And 
this, in turn, shows us the organism as bearing the effects produced by the 
actions previously projected by the animal toward the external world. This 
means that each living species has its own organically formed reality and that 
it is consequently unacceptable to consider it as a physical-chemical object, as 
a material body devoid of individuality or vital subjectivity.
With this brief explanation of von Uexküll’s concept of Umwelt, we can 
now turn to its reinterpretation by Heidegger and Gehlen. As I will show, for 
Heidegger the animal is poor-in-world (weltarm) in the sense of being “lack-
ing” because, due to its essence, the animal only has an Umwelt (understood 
as a “disinhibiting ring” that captivates it and which means it lives rather than 
exists); the human, on the other hand, as a linguistic-spiritual being that exists 
more than lives, is world-forming (Weltbildend). On the contrary, for Gehlen 
the human ontologically lacks Umwelt (understood as the self-enclosed life 
environment in which the animal lives in perfect attunement with its 
instincts), although it is thanks to this lack that the human can have a world 
(Welt) in which to historically and culturally “lead” a life.
However, the main issue I raise is that – independently of where the empha-
sis on “lack” is placed in the Umwelt-Welt bipolarity – the perspectives of Hei-
degger and Gehlen are revealed as theoretical strategies aimed at exorcising the 
presence of the animal in the human and the presence of the natural-biological 
in the historical-cultural. Both thinkers reveal themselves as being incapable of 
understanding the link between Umwelt and Welt as a very deep ontological 
nexus that unites animality and humanity. In my view, the understanding of 
this nexus is one of the most crucial issues in philosophy today.2
1. Heidegger: the animal lacking of Welt 
As is known, the threefold argument put forward by Heidegger (1995) in his 
lectures of 1929-1930 (Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics) defends the fol-
lowing theses: the stone is weltlos (worldless), the animal is weltarm (poor-in-
2. On the fundamental topic of the human-animal ontological relationship, and due to his 
highly innovative philosophical point of view, see Calarco (2015). 
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world) and the human is weltbildend (world-forming). The core concept is world 
(Welt) and it is this fundamental concept of metaphysics that Heidegger 
addresses in his lectures on animality: 
By means of a comparative examination of our three theses (the stone is world-
less, the animal is poor-in-world, man is world-forming) we hope to delimit 
in a provisional manner what we should understand by the term world in gen-
eral, as well as the direction in which we should look for such understanding. 
(Heidegger, 1995: 185)
What is clear at first glance is Heidegger’s emphasis on the centrality of the 
concept of Welt. Nonetheless, of particular note in relation to this threefold 
thesis is the ontologically selective nature of Welt. Welt is indeed at the centre 
of the trinity, acting as a theoretical axis around which the essence of human-
ity, of the vital-biological and of the physical-material are all defined. In other 
words, Welt is the metaphysical operator that marks the difference in essence 
between these three spheres of being and their corresponding modes of being. 
Defining the mode of being of stone, animal and human in terms of non-re-
lationship, lacking relationship and relationship-forming separates the three 
into ontologically distinct realms of being. Thus, the mode of being of the 
human as world-forming is both irreducible to the poor-in-world mode of 
being of the animal (representing biological life) and to the worldlessness 
of the stone (representing inert matter). The importance of this threefold 
thesis lies precisely in the theoretical requirement of having to reject any grad-
ualist notion of a fundamental biological continuity between the animal and 
the human that would contrast with the physical-material (Calarco, 2008, 
18-24). The fundamental error, according to Heidegger, would be a failure to 
understand the essential difference that radically separates the human from 
the animal. In a concluding paragraph of his lectures on animality, Heidegger 
summarizes his reflections on this unbridgeable ontological gap between 
humanity and animality in terms of an “abyss”, as follows: 
Yet this is precisely the place where the decisive problem lies concealed and 
demands to be exposed. For it is not simply a question of a qualitative otherness 
of the animal world as compared with the human world, and especially not 
a question of quantitative distinctions in range, depth, and breadth – not a 
question of whether or how the animal takes what is given to it in a different 
way, but rather of whether the animal can apprehend something as something, 
something as a being, at all. If it cannot, then the animal is separated from 
man by an abyss. (Heidegger, 1995: 264)
These lines raise questions as follows: Does the animal have a capacity for 
understanding something as a being or for converting something into a being 
endowed with meaning as part of a totality that signifies Welt? Should this 
capacity be considered as absent in the animal in view of another reality 
regarding the world of beings, whose ontological status it should be possible 
to clarify precisely with reflections on animality? In line with Heidegger I 
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further ask: What kind of reality does the animal have access to? As we know, 
Heidegger’s thesis regarding the animal mode of being in the world is that it 
is characterized by an essential “poverty”. But what kind of poverty? 
Heidegger refers to a lack, but this is not something that should be thought 
of in quantitative or qualitative terms of being poor in contrast with being 
rich, of having less in contrast with more: 
Yet even here it is not merely a case of comparing what is less at one moment 
with what is more at another. In this context ‘poor’ implies having a lack [cur-
sive mine] or insufficiency. Here too poverty represents a lacking or absence 
of something which could be present and generally ought to be present. (Hei-
degger, 1995: 195)
Heidegger, rather than holding a gradualist and continuous view, rejects the 
notion that the animal has access to a narrower fragment of world than 
the human. To reinforce this idea, he provides several examples of evident 
animal superiority to humans in terms of perceptual access to the world, 
referring, for instance, to the “discriminatory capacity of a falcon’s eye” and 
“the canine sense of smell” (Heidegger, 1995: 194). If the animal has more 
privileged access to a world than is available to human perception, is it not 
richer rather that poorer regarding this access? So, what is it that the animal 
lacks by being poor-in-world? Precisely what or where is the lack? Heidegger 
formulates an answer to this question with the explicit intention of developing 
a genuine understanding of animality. And note, to be authentically philo-
sophical, this understanding must follow a divergent path from that of conti-
nuity and gradualism, precisely because the latter would be incapable of clear-
ly identifying the animality of the animal or the humanity of the human. From 
this basic premise, Heidegger turns his attention to research by one of the 
leading biologists of the day, namely, Jacob von Uexküll, whose notion of 
Umwelt furnished Heidegger with a valuable conceptual element in his deni-
al of any form of gradual continuity between the animal and the human in 
their respective essences and ways of accessing the world.3 
As will be seen below, Heidegger, on the basis of his philosophical use of 
empirical-descriptive data associated with the notion of Umwelt, depicts the 
closedness of the world implied by Umwelt in a far narrower sense, and he 
defines the essence of the animal (animality) through the concept of Benommen-
heit (captivation), as a way of revealing the poverty of the animal’s mode of being 
3. Note that Heidegger cited the second editions (respectively 1921 and 1928) of von Uex-
küll’s works Umwelt und Innenweltder Tiere (1909) and Theoretische Biologie (1921), since 
the subsequent and more influential Streifzüge durch Umwelten und Menschen von Tieren 
only became available in 1934 [translated to English as A Stroll through the Worlds of Animals 
and Men in 1957]. For reasons of space, these texts and their place in von Uexküll’s theo-
retical trajectory cannot be considered here, so I refer the reader to the essential work by 
Brentari (2015). See, too, Buchanan (2008: 7-38), Mazzeo (2010) and the Special Issue of 
Semiotica (2001) about von Uexküll.
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with respect to the world.4 As has been rightly pointed out (Agamben, 2004: 
51), von Uexküll’s concepts of Umwelt and Merkmalträger were interpreted by 
Heidegger in terms of his own concepts of Enthemmungsring (disinhibiting ring) 
and Enthemmende (disinhibitor), respectively. Clarifying the meaning of this 
restrictive appropriation by Heidegger is decisive when considering the poor-in-
world concept that Heidegger viewed as the essence of animality.
Let me now consider how this appropriation conditions the Heideggeri-
an understanding of animality. As already implied in the extract cited above 
(“…whether the animal can apprehend something as something, something 
as a being …”, Heidegger, 1995: 264), the animal, locked into its own Umwelt, 
is not capable of acting in a world understood as a set of beings interlinked by 
a network of meanings. The poor-in-worldness of the animal (its “lack”) is 
precisely its inability to objectify a being in its presence so as to convert it, 
through concepts, into an abstract element that would yield deeper meanings. 
Hence, permanently locked in as it is by stimuli from its own specific disin-
hibiting ring, the animal cannot distinguish between self and the other sub-
sisting autonomously outside this self: 
The behaviour of the animal, contrary to how it might appear, does not and 
never can relate to present-at-hand things singly or collectively. Rather, the 
animal surrounds itself with a disinhibiting ring which prescribes what can 
affect or occasion its behaviour. Since this self-encirclement belongs to the 
animal, it always intrinsically bears its disinhibiting ring along with it and does 
so as long as it is alive. Or more precisely – the life of the animal is precisely 
the struggle [Ringen] to maintain this encircling ring or sphere within which a 
quite specifically articulated manifold of disinhibitions can arise. (Heidegger, 
1995: 255)
Heidegger’s view is that the vital actions of the animal cannot be compared 
to the existential actions of the human as being-in-the-world. The lizard bask-
ing on a stone does not know that the stone is stone “as such”, or that the sun 
is sun “as such”, or that its basking is the action of basking “as such”. The 
lizard, rather, relates to the stone because this has the function of indicating a 
default instinctive reaction (namely, hot surfaces trigger physical and chemical 
processes necessary for the survival of cold-blooded animals). In other words, 
it lies on the stone because the stone is a disinhibiting stimulus in its prede-
termined vital programme (Heidegger, 1995: 197). The lizard acts this way 
simply because the perception and action are both written into its instinctual 
structure as an innate capacity to satisfy a certain instinct: 
Now if something resembling a surrounding environment [Umwelt] is open for 
the animal and its behaviour, we must now ask whether it is possible to clarify 
this any further. Instinctual and subservient capability for […] the totality of 
its self-absorbed capability, is an interrelated driven-ness of the instinctual 
4. On this topic, see Brentari (2015: 198-204), Buchanan (2008: 39-114), Calarco (2008: 
15-53), Cimatti (2013: 7-33), and more extensively Bassanese (2004).
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drives which encircle the animal. It does so in such a way that it is precisely 
this encirclement which makes possible the behaviour in which the animal is 
related to other things. Related to other things – although these other things are 
not manifest as beings. Capability for […] is not a matter of comportment 
toward beings. (Heidegger, 1995: 253-254)
The world of the human as a receptacle of meanings is thus closed to the 
animal. This closure affects the animal in its essence because its being poor-
in-world means it lacks the ability to open up to “as suchness”. In other words, 
the world that is closed off to the animal as a consequence of its own ontolog-
ical structure is closed off to the extent that this world can only be understood 
in light of the manifestation of the truth latent in the being, which, in turn, is 
understood to be the ontological prerogative of the human. That is, it is impos-
sible for the animal to understand the Being of the being, because it is incapa-
ble of opening up to the manifestness of being “as” being. What motivates the 
encircled behaviour of the animal is not the openness of a world, but rather 
the pressure of a disinhibitor – as recognized by the animal’s instinctual struc-
ture – that relieves the animal from the inhibition keeping it locked in. 
If for Heidegger “living means: being in an animal kind of way”, then the 
animal “does not exist but merely lives” (Heidegger, 1995: 210) – just as it 
sees but does not observe, and hears but does not listen. We might also add 
that since the animal merely lives, then it corresponds to the human to exist 
rather than just live, because, unlike what happens with the human, it is 
impossible for the animal to link actions to a self-conscious individuality, to 
a Selbst confronted with a world of meanings: 
Every animal surrounds itself with this disinhibiting ring, and not merely sub-
sequently once the animal has already been living for a certain period of time, 
because this encircling belongs to the innermost organization of the animal 
and its fundamental morphological structure. The way in which the animal is 
in each case taken by the whole is directed by the range of possible disinhibi-
tions within its encirclement. Such being taken is open for manifold forms of 
disinhibition, but this openness is precisely not the manifestness of anything 
that behaviour could relate to as beings. This open being taken intrinsical-
ly involves the withholding of any possibility of apprehending beings. This 
self-encircling entails an open absorption in it – not in the so called ‘interior’ 
of the animal, but in the ring of the interrelated drivenness of instinctual 
drives as they open themselves up. (Heidegger, 1995: 255) 
What defines animal life, therefore, is a functional capacity to behave in 
accordance with an external environment, and an inability to act consciously 
on the basis of a fundamental distinction between self and other – as is char-
acteristic of the human – given that the animal is motivated solely by pre-
formed instincts. For Heidegger the animal is ultimately locked into its instinct 
and, therefore, can never be aware of the totality of being “as” subsisting being, 
merely of the occasion of instinctual relief addressed to fulfilling its predeter-
mined vital programme. According to him, it is this absolute Benommenheit 
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(captivation) regarding its disinhibiting ring that defines the essence of ani-
mality. With no possibility of perceiving anything “as such”, the animal is 
considered poor-in-world; it lacks the ability to perceive being in the sense of 
the manifestness of beings:
To say that captivation is the essence of animality means: The animal as such 
does not stand within a manifestness of beings. Neither its so-called environment 
nor the animal itself are manifest as beings”. (Heidegger, 1995: 248)
More radically, however, as underlined by Agamben (2004: 59), for Hei-
degger the animal cannot have a closed understanding of the world because 
the world “as such” has never been open to it. The animal, in fact, lives beyond 
any possibility of alternating between world openness and closedness, because 
it lacks the world as a manifestation of being to which it may or may not have 
access. So, captivated in a disinhibiting ring, inside which it is incapable of 
distinguishing between its own vital and disinhibiting behaviours, the only 
reality to which it is open is essentially that of the uninhibited, or relief, 
instinct. The animal, in other words, is captivated by the disinhibiting ring 
that encircles it and which it can never escape as long as it lives. This would 
imply, then, that the environment of animal life and the world of human 
existence are irreducible one to the other, to the point that they should be 
thought of as being separated by an unbridgeable ontological abyss.5
In conclusion, it can be argued that Heidegger, in affirming the specificity 
of human essence as compared to animal essence, adopts the characteristic 
anthropogenic approach of our metaphysical tradition, according to which, in 
order to think as proper to the human, we need to proceed comparatively and 
generate a theoretical inclusion-exclusion space for the animal. This is equiva-
lent to saying that the essence of biological-animal life can only be properly 
understood if we remove any hint of subjectivity that could bring the animal 
close to the existential dimension of the human; likewise, only by excluding all 
strictly biological-animal elements – what Agamben referred to as “bare life” 
(zoe) – from the ontological dimension of the human will we be able to arrive 
at an appropriate definition of humanity (Agamben, 1998).6 
2. Gehlen: the human lacking of Umwelt
I now consider Gehlen’s concept of animality as described in his major work 
from 1940, Man. His Nature and Place in the World, generally regarded as a 
manifesto of philosophical anthropology (D’Anna, 2001; Pansera, 2005). In 
the all-important introduction to this work, Gehlen strongly defends the thesis 
that the biological nature of the human is lacking, incomplete and indetermi-
5. On this topic, see Derrida (1989; 2008: 141-160), and Haar (1985: 63-79); for a different 
point of view, see Krell (1992).
6. I have further developed my insights regarding the Heideggerian philosophy on animality 
in another paper: Firenze (2017).
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nate, because the human is ontologically destined for self-formation. This is 
because of a key ontological fact: the human has a world, not an environment, 
and lives not like other animals but according to the mandates of culture. 
The animal lives in a particular environment determined according to spe-
cies, and it is this close link between organism and environment that causes the 
animal to be biologically and instinctively highly specialized. The human, how-
ever, is a biologically non-specialized being, whose instinctual structure is gov-
erned by a fundamental organic primitivism. To ensure preservation as a nat-
ural being, the humans cannot, like the animals, relate to a particular 
environment; rather, the humans must generate their own vital dimension by 
building their own world, thereby developing a “second nature” based on cul-
ture (Gehlen, 1988: 29). In other words, unlike the animals inserted in and 
enveloped by their environment (as if an extension of their body without which 
they could not live), the humans do not have a rigidly circumscribed environ-
ment that fulfils the function of a vital sphere in which each perception corre-
sponds to a predetermined action. Indeed, the relationship of the animals with 
their environment could be viewed as a non-relationship, given that there is no 
distance between the organism and its vital sphere – there is, rather, a direct 
adhesion between the two polarities. Strictly speaking, one could say that the 
animal is a perfect closed circle of organism-environment, whereas the human 
represents the unique case of world-openness. Hence, the human, as a biologi-
cally lacking organism, is destined to gradually develop ontological potential:
For most animals, […], the environment is an unchanging milieu to which the 
specialized organ structure of the animal is adapted and within which equally 
specific, innate, instinctive behaviour is carried out. Specialized organic struc-
ture and environment are mutually dependent concepts. (Gehlen, 1988: 27)
As with Heidegger, von Uexküll’s biological theory of Umwelt also influenced 
Gehlen.7 As Gehlen himself points out, we are indebted to von Uexküll for 
having described “the relationship between the structure of an animal’s organs 
and its environment”. Indeed, the great contribution of von Uexküll’s theory to 
the formulation of a philosophical anthropological perspective is that it has 
demonstrated how “each species has its own unique environment which it expe-
riences and masters through its own system of specialized organs” (Gehlen, 
1988: 65). Therefore, according to Gehlen, animal Umwelt is a closed circuit 
composed of a series of preestablished perceptual-operational functions that 
prevent the emergence of the kind of distance between perception and action 
that is necessary in order to represent objects. This full and perfect concurrence 
between stimulus and action reflects a fusion between organism and environ-
ment that is impossible for the human. 
7. Among the texts by von Uexküll cited by Gehlen in this context, we find those works already 
mentioned concerning the Heideggerian reading, mainly Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere 
(1909), Theoretische Biologie (1921), but also the fundamental work Streifzüge durch Umwel-
ten und Menschen von Tieren (1934).
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Characterized by – and due to – a lack of biological Umwelt, the human 
is faced with a representational excess that gives rise to a world imbued with 
meaning. Summing up, animal Umwelt and human Welt are irreducible to 
each other, and so, by definition, are mutually exclusive: 
Man’s ‘world’, in which the perceivable is clearly not limited to what is nec-
essary for basic survival, may at first seem to be a disadvantage. To say that 
man is ‘world-open’ means that he foregoes an animal adaptation to a specific 
environment. […] The lack of physical specialization, his vulnerability, as well 
as his astonishing lack of true instincts together form a coherent whole which 
is manifested in his ‘world-openness’ (M. Scheler) or, what amounts to the 
same thing, in his lack of ties to a specific environment. (Gehlen, 1988: 27) 8
It is here that Gehlen’s anthropocentric theoretical perspective becomes 
evident: the animal is the ideal analytical object in that it defines the essence 
of humanity through contrast and through the reciprocal exclusion of onto-
logical properties. Whereas the animal exists in an environmental context 
because this is biologically predetermined, the biologically indeterminate 
human exists in a cultural context; whereas the animal has a complete and 
perfect instinctive structure, the human has poorly developed instincts and, 
consequently, being incomplete and imperfect, must determine his own vital 
potential; and whereas the animal is biologically specialized, the human is 
biologically unspecialized. Basically, one could say that the human represents 
potential in its purest state, whereas the animal cannot possibly be other than 
what it is, given its innate biological structure. This is, if you will, a more 
sophisticated way of reaffirming the classical opposition between human free-
dom and natural necessity. 
Let me now turn the attention to the element that seems to ontologically 
define human nature, namely, biological lack. The human animal, not being 
pure instinct like the animal, has certain faculties understood as potentialities 
that cannot be identified in terms of a number of predefined behaviours, as 
occurs with the animal. Instinct is, of course, characterized by an operational 
range that enables the animal to learn and perform different actions suggested 
by its innate biological structure. However, these possible actions can never go 
beyond the plane of operations that are predetermined in terms of the animal’s 
vital programming. However, to paraphrase Gehlen, man, as pure potential, is 
plastic by nature, a sui generis animal that never ceases to adapt to reality. 
Gehlen supports his anthropological and philosophical perspective with 
the central theoretical concept of Entlastung (relief ), which he uses to reflect the 
perception-action disparity that characterizes the lack of biological being in 
the human. As Gehlen puts it: “Man’s world openness might appear to be a 
great burden. He is flooded with stimulation, with an abundance of impres-
sions, which he somehow must learn to cope with”. For this reason, “relying 
8. Scheler’s text Gehlen is making reference to is that of the famous 1928 talk titled Die 
Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos (cf. Scheler, 1961).
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on his own means and efforts, man must find relief from the burden of over-
whelming stimulation; he must transform his deficiencies into opportunities 
for survival” (Gehlen, 1988: 28). If, as we have seen, the animal is character-
ized by a perfect circularity that binds perceptions to actions in a circum-
scribed environment, the human is characterized by a mismatch between 
perceptions and actions. The human is exposed, in fact, to an overabundance 
of perceptions and sensory stimuli which find no immediate response – in its 
constitutively lacking innate instinctual structure – that would result ipso facto 
in action. The human – unlike the animal, which is unable to mark any dis-
tance between itself and the environment – obtains relief from the prolifera-
tion of perceptions and stimuli by neutralizing pressures arising continuously 
from the world; the human thereby generates a distance from which to select 
certain perceptions and stimuli over others and so avoids a paralysis of action. 
In a situation of overabundant perceptions and stimuli and in the absence of 
perfect perception-action circularity, relief suspends action. But relief also 
allows action to become independent of the perception; in other words, relief 
makes a human action irreducible to an animal reaction. 
Inserted in the space created by the distance between perception and 
action (opened up by relief, understood as a specific human biological prin-
ciple) are all the essential characteristics of human beings such as language, 
consciousness, work, technology; in a word, culture. The key question lies in 
the natural and biological origins of culture, since this seems to Gehlen to be 
a physical and organic prosthesis that allows the biologically lacking human 
to find a functional substitute for animal Umwelt. Arguably, Gehlen sees relief 
as natural compensation for the human animal whose biological nature is 
defined by the lack of a predetermined vital space. Or, put another way, 
biological indeterminacy is predetermined in the human animal as the onto-
logical impossibility of connecting with an Umwelt. We could therefore con-
sider the gap between nature and culture to have a strong biological basis, 
since culture contains and limits this constitutive biological indeterminacy 
of the human animal. 
The analysis as developed to this point shows how the central terms used by 
Gehlen to depict the ontological difference between animal and human are the 
selfsame concepts of Umwelt and Welt. Accordingly, for Gehlen, man builds Welt 
because he is biologically lacking and does not have animal Umwelt. In other 
words, whereas the environment is the vital enclosed space where the animal 
relies on its instincts, the world is an open existential space where the human, 
formed through culture, can “lead his life” – to use Gehlen’s own expression 
referring to the fact that man, unlike the animal, “does not so much live as 
lead his life” (Gehlen, 1988: 10). In this sense, by imagining the human as a 
biologically lacking being (indeterminate by nature) who is essentially deter-
mined by praxis, we can finally circumscribe the anthropogenic question. In 
other words, the human becomes human by denying the dictates of animal 
nature and by being a Welt builder precisely because he is biologically indeter-
minate, because he lacks Umwelt: 
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‘Unnatural’ culture is the product of a unique being, itself of an ‘unnatural’ 
construction in comparison to animals. The cultural world exists for man in 
exactly the same way in which the environment exists for animals. For this 
reason alone, it is wrong to speak of an environment, in a strictly biological 
sense, for man. His world-openness is directly related to his unspecialized 
structure; similarly, his lack of physical means corresponds directly to his 
self-created ‘second nature’. (Gehlen, 1988: 29)
My own main objection to Gehlen’s perspective is that his placing of 
Umwelt and Welt in direct opposition reveals a profound inability to adequate-
ly consider the ties that bind the human to the animal, existence to living, and 
culture to nature. For Gehlen, man finds compensation for a biological lack 
of Umwelt and a defective instinctive-animal constitution (that is, zoê) in the 
technical-cultural artifice. In my opinion, this would imply that the ani-
mal-human rupture lies at the very core of what is biological-natural. In fact, 
when Gehlen describes the natural being of the human as lacking and incom-
plete, he does so on the basis of an anthropomorphic vision that the human 
species has reserved to it a biological nature of its own: 
In order to survive, [man] must master and re-create nature, and for this 
reason must experience the world. He acts because he is unspecialized and 
deprived of a natural environment to which he is adapted. The epitome of 
nature restructured to serve his needs is called culture and the culture world 
is the human world. There are no ‘natural men’ in a strict sense […]. Culture is 
therefore the ‘second nature’ – man’s restructured nature, within which he can 
survive. (Gehlen, 1988: 29)
In this sense, it could be argued that Gehlen’s theoretical framework repro-
duces the anthropocentric perspective detected above in regard to Heidegger. 
In my view, in fact, and contrary to what he affirms, Gehlen does not really 
consider the human in terms of a specific natural biological essence, given that 
he views a rupture between the human and the animal and between culture 
and nature occurring directly in the very core of zoê. 
Metaphysically, to consider that the biological dimension of the human is 
destined by nature itself to be negated through work and the technical-cultural 
artifice is, in fact, to imply an inability to consider animal life from an alternative 
perspective. It is equivalent to excising qualities and properties from an animal zoê 
and projecting them on a human zoê – qualities and properties, which, to para-
phrase Nietzsche, are “too human”. Strictly speaking, it would be wrong to define 
the human as a praxic, cultural or historical “animal”, because the biological nature 
of man, by definition, excludes anything that could be associated with animality.9 
9. I do not agree with the positive interpretation of Gehlen’s work, as supported by Biuso 
(2002), Galimberti (1999) or Pansera (2005), among others. According to them, culture 
is to be identified with the specifically biological-animal nature of the human. On the 
contrary, as I am trying to show, to Gehlen human culture amounts to humanist and 
antinatural negation of human animality. On this point, see Marchesini (2002: 15-23).
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Thus, to refer to the biological nature of the human species in Gehlenian terms 
is to perpetuate a profoundly anthropocentric misunderstanding, conditioned 
by a Promethean-humanist vision. From the outset, there is no real theoretical 
requirement to consider the animality of the human from an alternative per-
spective. 
The danger is that the image of the animal itself will become so blurred as 
to fade altogether if we project on it, as an unquestioned theoretical condition, 
the distorted image of an animal sick from its excess of humanity. The human 
is indeed sick and biologically “monstrous”, precisely due to a lack of animal-
ity; but it is equally true that it is because of this lack that man – incomplete 
and imperfect, according to Gehlen – can construct himself and, thanks to 
work and technology (namely, culture), become the “master of nature”. Phil-
osophical anthropology fails to resolve the issue of the biological significance 
of human life; rather, it muddies the waters to the point of radically anthro-
pomorphizing zoê. Gehlen’s theoretical strategy could be viewed as an anthro-
pogenic attempt to split zoê by assigning essential attributes removed from the 
human to the animal and vice versa.
3. Conclusion
To sum up, my reflections on Heidegger and Gehlen revisit certain ontological 
assumptions that seem to be inadequate in terms of addressing the still unre-
solved question of the natural-biological basis for human existence. In this 
regard, Heidegger’s view that the animal is poor-in-world is pointedly significant 
when confronted with its apparent inverse of the biologically lacking human 
defended by Gehlen. As we have seen, from the Heideggerian point of view, the 
split between the animal and the human occurs in an ontological space that is 
external to the biological-natural; in other words, the split lies precisely in the 
biological-natural/human-existential abyss that ontologically separates Dasein 
from zoê. For Heidegger, the animal has Umwelt because it lacks Welt as a net-
work of meanings related to the unit of meaning “world”; the Gehlenian inverse 
is that man is capable of shaping Welt precisely because he lacks Umwelt. 
Irrespective of whether this lack is emphasized on one or the other side of 
the Umwelt-Welt bipolarity, both positions reveal themselves to be theoretical 
strategies aimed at exorcising the animal from the human. Both Heidegger 
and Gehlen failed to understand the link between humanity and animality, 
precisely because they failed to consider the link between Umwelt and Welt in 
terms of a deeper bond between natural life and human existence – a bond 
that represents one of the most pressing milestones in contemporary philo-
sophical thinking.
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